

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

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STAINER

MUSIC AND ITS RELATION
TO THE INTELLECT AND THE
EMOTIONS

Mus 100.502



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IN ITS

RELATION TO THE INTELLECT

AND

THE EMOTIONS

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THE substance of this Essay was delivered as a Professional Lecture in the Sheldonian Theatre, Oxford, on June 8, 1892, but as the subject is one on which much attention is now being bestowed, I make no apology for presenting it to the public in this form.

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MUSIC IN ITS RELATION TO THE INTEL- LECT AND THE EMOTIONS.

An enquiry into the relative functions of the Intellect and the Emotions in the art of music must necessarily be of considerable interest, as well as of serious importance to thoughtful musicians.

It is an old battlefield, one of those on which the combat rages violently for a time, then smoulders for a period, only to burst out with renewed vigour and with greater asperity on both sides. In some form or another the discussion has attained the respectable age of a couple of thousand years. But it is quite evident that one of the chief causes of disagreement in our day lies in the common fact that the disputants make use of scientific and philosophical terms so carelessly and loosely; they do not condescend to stop and define their terms before they rush into argument. In everyday life we cannot pause to make all our language scientifically or philosophically accurate. We must still continue to let a child say that honey is sweet, or vinegar is sour without stopping it to explain that when honey comes in contact with our organs of taste, a sensation is produced which

(3)

we call sweetness, but that this sweetness is entirely inside ourselves, a subjective sensation, not an external reality or entity. Honey is a cause, sweetness an effect; vinegar a cause, sourness an effect. So we are calling an effect a cause, when we say the honey is sweet, or the vinegar is sour. It would seem to be a matter of common experience that the more remote the cause of a sensation is from the sensation it produces, the more difficult it becomes to explain to children that the effect is *not* the cause. For example, any intelligent child, I fancy, would grasp the idea that it is the taste of honey which is sweet, not the honey itself, that the taste of vinegar is sour, not the vinegar itself.

But it becomes more difficult to explain to a child that the odour of flowers in a room or a garden is in the child's own head and not in the flowers. Still more difficult to teach it that the field is not green, nor the sky blue, but that all we know about colour is that certain substances by absorbing certain rays of light leave other rays which produce the sensations which we name colours; and so on. More difficult still is it to explain the nature of sound, even to grown-up and educated persons.

When a molecular disturbance of air is caused by a regular series of minute blows caused by a vibrating body, the molecules thus disturbed leave

their position for a short time and push each other on and on—in turn, each molecule returning to rest in its original position when the vibrating cause ceases.

Such disturbances which, on account of a certain analogy to ordinary waves, we call sound-waves, proceed equally in every direction away from the causal energy. If, therefore, no obstructions of any kind existed, a vibrating body would send forth a sort of ball or sphere of sound-waves, which, by alternate contraction and rarefaction, would have the nature of a ball with a series of films or peels one outside the other. But all this takes place in absolute silence. We will now suppose that a thin thread of this disturbed air finds its way into a human ear, it there meets a membrane, and setting it in motion, the brain is communicated with by means of sympathetic fibres, and the man says: "I hear a sound." Now what I want you to realise is this: there is no such thing as a noise or sound outside our own individual heads.

The cause of the sound works its way to us *in absolute silence*; sound, in fact, does not exist in *itself* but only in us, it is purely *subjective*. It does not exist externally to us, is not *objective*, is not an entity. Some one may exclaim, this cold scientific explanation of sound deprives music of

all its romantic charms ! Nothing of the sort ! let us examine the matter a little closer.

When a symphony or accompanied chorus is being performed, the various instruments or voices, according to their quality of tone and pitch, are sending forth waves of various shapes and outlines, which, as they join each other on their outward course, become merged and superposed into waves of a single form ; each of which, of course, contains in itself the sum of the waves which constituted it. When a thread of this complicated wave enters the human ear, it beats against the tympanum of the ear as before, and again the fibres of Corti's organ are ready to tell the brain what has reached them.

This organ of Corti is the most marvellous musical instrument known to us, it consists of many *thousands* of fibres or rods which are fixed at one end, while the other end lies in minute sacs of nerve tissue ; so delicate and clever is this instrument that it analyses the contents of the complicated sound-wave, takes it to pieces, and passes on to the intellect the fact that such and such instruments are being played, or, such and such voices used ; it first analyses and then allows the intellect to reconstruct and know the many and several external causes of the one complicated wave. Could anything be more romantic or poetical than this ? It is more than a romance, it is a miracle ! So you

see how important it is that we should never forget that when we are listening to music each hearer has sound *only in his own head*; there is no noise or sound whatever existing in the space *between the hearers' heads*; no noise or sound whatever between *each single head of the hearers and the instruments or organs of voice* causing vibrations, and no noise or sound whatever *in the instruments themselves or the organs of voice themselves*.

All sound therefore is purely subjective; there is no such thing as sound *in itself*.

This view of sound is so necessary to any scientific or philosophical discussion that I shall try once more to enforce it.

Suppose that I were to obtain and set up machinery by which the organ—say in Westminster Abbey—could be played automatically.

Imagine that you are all of you with me in that building, that I set the machinery going, and that you hear the music resounding through the beautiful arches; then, suppose that we all leave the building, lock the doors and go quite away, what would happen? A child would reply: “Why the Abbey would still be full of sound and music, although there would be nobody there to hear it.” Not so; there would be dead and complete silence in the building, notwithstanding the vigorous and successful working of the automatic machinery. Yes, dead silence!

The molecular disturbance of the air would certainly go on, but it would go on in absolute silence.

I hope no further proof is needed of the fact that sound is an *effect* on us, not a cause which effects us. If this subjectivity of sound is not completely realised by us, we are not one whit less silly than the child who thinks a big drum is filled with thunder; or who believes that a trumpeter points his tube at the audience, and fires off (so to speak) successive pieces or charges of sound, which go rolling and bowling along till they hit the hearers' heads; or than the savage who would cut open a fiddle in order to see what the music inside is like!

Music is not the only case in which the common forms of language lead us into inaccurate and unscientific statements. Although we have for several centuries been fully aware that the earth rolls round a relatively fixed body — the sun — yet we are compelled to talk of sun-rise and sun-set.

Not only do we habitually speak of effects as being causes, but we are constantly depicting imaginary realities and entities which are merely creations of our forms of thought.

Poets lead us sadly astray in this respect: they speak of a Spirit of Evil and of a Spirit of Beauty, &c., as if they were immaterial; but they often afterwards describe the personal appearance of these

Spirits and make them talk! Sculptors, and painters too, have helped to personify non-entities. We, in Oxford, are proud to own the portraits of the Seven Cardinal Virtues as they appear in the West window of New College Chapel; and as they were painted by no less a hand than that of Sir Joshua Reynolds, I suppose we may take it for granted that they are excellent likenesses of these seven interesting ladies!

All this confusion of cause and effect, of subjective and objective, of thought and reality, is of very little importance in ordinary life; but, as I said before, in philosophical discussions we must use all our terms and expressions with careful exactitude.

Out of the many sounds of various pitch, which could be produced by the human voice, mankind, long, long ago, began to select and arrange some in a definite order; science soon came forward with a helping hand to explain and perhaps to suggest: hence grew a Musical Scale — the first step which differentiated music from mere animal noise; the first bit of plastic material out of which, in after ages, our Art was to mould and shape her endless store of beautiful mental and emotional fabrics. Disconnected or uncoördinated sounds are to music what unquarried stone is to architecture, but notes of a scale are hewn stones ready to be poised in space.

The importance of the growth of a Scale as the first step in music as an Art has not been overlooked by Helmholtz, who says: "The construction of scales and of harmonic tissue is a product of artistic invention, and by no means furnished by the formation or natural function of our ear, as it has hitherto been most generally asserted."

"The aim and effort of science," says Tyndall, "is to explain the unknown in terms of the known. Explanation, therefore, is conditioned by knowledge." Let us further trace the growth of the Art briefly, and then ask how far its results can be scientifically explained.

With the adjustment of a scale simultaneously, perhaps intuitively, arose the recognition of the fact that a succession of sounds can embody Rhythm just as much as a succession of mere noises.

Such nations as made use of singing primarily for the purpose of reciting sacred prose writings or stories, would be longer in discovering the rhythmic quality of music than those who associated music and poetry at once. But in time Song and Dance, that is to say, tune, poetry, and dance were welded and bound together by their mutual adhesion to the laws of rhythm. Then, as time rolled on, instruments of music became more cleverly constructed, and they were used for the

accompaniment of tune, poetry, or dance, separately as well as in combination.

This little beginning of the expansion of instrumental music was destined to lead step by step to a mighty revolution in the Art; for men found that if the instrument played the tune, they could realise the same rhythmic pleasure as if the dance were being deftly footed; or, as it has been prettily expressed, such men discovered in instrumental music "dancing sounds." But as vocal music had undoubtedly been cultivated long, long before pure instrumental music (which is an evolution of the last few centuries), so also vocal music became full-grown when instrumental music was an infant. A scale was intuitively felt to be, as Helmholtz says, "harmonic tissue," and so, pure vocal music gradually evolved into the grandest forms of Polyphony; and the highest development of this many-parted song was attained before instrumental music had made its first effort to walk alone. An attempt was made to graft the style of imitative polyphonic vocal music on to independent instrumental music, but the result was so uninteresting that it was speedily dropped.

Voices were glad to borrow from dancers their Ballets and other pieces in dance-rhythms, but string instruments were unable to effect an equitable exchange with vocalists, or derive any pleasure

from playing the parts of a contrapuntal madrigal — even if described as “apt for viols.”

But the deep impression which the rhythmic property of music made on the human mind is clearly shown by the fact that for several centuries in the history of modern European music, all the most popular dance-tunes were the tunes of songs, and all the most favourite songs were turned into dance-tunes; a process even now very much in vogue, as you all know who have danced to the “Pinafore Quadrilles,” or “Sweethearts’” Waltz.

But there was a higher recognition of the rhythmic value of the dance than this; our great musical geniuses strung different dances together in sets, and by issuing these “Suites” they were unconsciously leading up to the formation of independent Forms of Instrumental Music. These “Suites” exhibited what was good, and also gave warning as to what should be avoided. They taught that the use of the same key for a series of short movements, however different they were in rhythmic texture, lead to a coldness and lack of interest, and therefore, that the introduction of new themes in new keys was something to be desired and sought out. They also distinctly showed that something might be found which would prove superior to the unvaried iteration of set themes, and this something proved to be

Thematic Development. Thus they led up to the Symphony itself; while, at the same time, the perfected instruments were returning to the accompaniment of their old master and friend, Vocal Music, and the combination of the two rendered possible the Oratorio and the Opera. Nor could any of these have been attained unless men had succeeded after much experiment in finding out how to write down music, so that it could be reproduced just as language can be reproduced when written down. Hence the development of musical notation side by side and parallel to the evolution of the Art.

Comparing the grammar of ordinary language with that of music, Dr. Pole says*: “ Since it is necessary that learners should have some safe guide to enable them to speak and write in accordance with the received forms, the plan is adopted of framing rules of grammar and syntax, which, however, pretend to no authority in themselves, being merely a commentary on the examples found in the writings taken for models.

“ Let then, by all means, similar rules for musical composition be established and enforced; but at the same time, let it be properly understood what they mean. Do not tell the student that such and such combinations, such and such progres-

* “ Philosophy of Music.”

sions, are dictated by an unquestionable origin in natural necessity or natural laws, and that to violate them is a crime against philosophy and science.

“Tell him instead that they have been agreed to by the common consent of the best composers, and that for him to ignore or refuse to follow them is an offence of the same nature as it would be wilfully to write incorrect English, or to do any other act at variance with the ordinary practice of mankind.”

But we must here call attention to an important fact—namely, that as all musical productions have always been and still continually are under process of analysis by hearers and critics, it follows that methods of melodic progression, treatment of chords, and the outlines of Form and Construction are constantly added to Treatises on Music, until at last certain progressions become as familiar and as necessary in music as *idioms in speech*, and similarly, musical Forms become known and open to recognition. But as all these gradually cease to be new, and as they become incorporated as part of the syntax of music, so do they come within the scope of intellect; in other words, as the Unknown in the Art becomes known and systematised, so in proportion the field of the operation of the Intellect is extended, and the effect

on the Emotions is pushed farther back. Emotions are not evoked by parsing and scanning a Poem.

• It is clear that for Analysis of music, what is required of the listener is primarily the power of receiving the physical sensations of sound, then of rapidly exercising his intellect upon these sensations by coördinating and arranging them, and passing a mental judgment on *what* the composition *is*; lastly, he can (still by his intellect) pass a verdict on its correctness or incorrectness, that is to say, how far it is or is not in accordance with those accepted rules and regulations which we call the grammar of music in its widest sense; this grammar being, as we have said, nothing more than a series of quotations drawn from the works of the best masters, analysed and arranged. A grammar of language is of exactly the same kind; and like it, our grammar of music has its accidence, its syntax, and its prosody.

Before a hearer can venture to offer a criticism on a composition, he must be as familiar with this musical grammar as he is with the grammar of his own language. Armed with this knowledge, the intellect of the hearer *can* pass, as we have said, a verdict on music, limited to the question of its correctness or incorrectness; but that is all.

The only fact which raises Music, Sculpture, Painting, and Architecture to a higher grade than

the processes of Touch, Taste, or Smell, is that the former, in their own various spheres, make a demand upon the intellect, and by means of the intellect upon the emotions, which the latter do not. The only thing which prevents us from composing a Symphony in Touch, by a succession and combination of various materials to be touched; and similarly a symphony in tastes or smells, is that separate sensations of Touch, Taste, or Smell do not present themselves to the intellect as capable of being coördinated and systematized, and therefore do not affect the emotions. It is evident then that Art cannot be said to exist unless there is an appeal to the Emotions by means of the Intellect. If the thing created appeals *only* to the Intellect, it is not a work of art. It is for this reason that our multiplication table, or a complicated geometrical figure, wonderful as they would seem to a rude savage, never can be considered as "works of art."

Helmholtz, whose philosophical insight is as clear as his judgment as a physicist, states this very plainly when he says:—"A work known and acknowledged as the product of mere intellect, will never be accepted as a work of art, however perfect be its adaptation to its end."

But in order to avoid any confusion, we must be careful to separate the function of the creator of

music (the composer) from that of the critic of music (the hearer).

. The task of a composer is synthetical — he puts together the material of his art according to some aim; on the other hand, the task of the hearer is analytical, he resolves the whole into its component parts before he can finally pass a judgment on it. But no aiming at good art by the creator, no criticism of music by its hearer, no separation of good and bad can take place, until creator and hearer have on some common ground passed judgment on certain questions which are not within the scope of mere intellect, but are within the realm of taste. The judge in this Court of taste is our sentiment of the Beautiful. Whence comes this sentiment of the Beautiful?

We know not; we can only describe it as one of those faculties existing in the mental and physical constitution of man, which is either called out of potentiality into activity, or is accumulated and vivified — by civilisation, education, and culture.

But it largely depends for the nourishment of its existence on what we call the “Temperament” of the individual. Whether a special physical temperament produces and nurtures this sentiment of the Beautiful, or whether a pre-existent sense of the Beautiful can only expand under certain conditions of bodily physique — we cannot tell.

But all of us in our daily intercourse with our fellow men and women, recognize it immediately and instinctively in its fortunate possessor. How it lifts the few above the common crowd of the many! With what an interest it invests them! Its sphere is not confined to Art, it energises in the realm of Thought, Action, and Moral principles (the "beauty of holiness" is not a mere figure of speech), it moulds not only the Artist, but the Philosopher, the Patriot, the Philanthropist, the Saint. In short, it is an essential quality of that higher individuality which makes men leaders of men, and stamps their name on the pages of historical record.

This great gift, however, is not destined to be fruitful unless it is coupled with others; for its full growth it needs a power of rapid generalisation and a faculty of absorbing knowledge from all surrounding sources.

If to this is added a *creative power*, we are face to face with what we call genius. But amongst even the hearers of music, no true criticism can be given if this sentiment of the beautiful is absent. Its operation commences where the explanation of the intelligence ends.

If an attempt were made to catalogue the duties of this sentiment we might, perhaps, say that it should be able to appreciate the beauty of—

uniformity — which does not sink into dulness ; variety — which does not produce a sense of confusion ; relation of component parts — which gives an idea of unity ; contrast *without opposition* between the contrasting elements, and over and above all this, the artistic aim of the composer — that is, the thought underlying his mode of expression ; and lastly, it must be able to grasp and sympathize with that emotional frame of mind of the composer which compelled him to exert his creative gift.

As regards the Thought which underlies a Composition of Art, Hegel is very clear ; he says : “ To the beautiful there must always belong two factors, the Thought and the Material, but both are inseparably together ; the material expresses nothing but the Thought that animates and illumines it ; and of this Thought it is only the external manifestation.”

But as we have just said, there is something besides a Thought underlying a work of musical art ; there is the emotional condition of its creator. Véron expresses this clearly ; he says : “ The value of a work of art rests entirely on the degree of energy with which it exhibits the intellectual character and emotional condition of its author. The only rule imposed on it is the necessity for a certain conformity with the mode of thinking and feeling of the public to which it appeals.”

These remarks refer to the state of a composer of a work of art ; let us see what can be said about the recipient's condition.

The relation between Sensation and Thought is thus admirably stated by a recent writer* : “ Feeling and knowledge are, finally, only two sides of the original fundamental fact, consciousness, which is a dynamic creative thing in relation to its own content. It begins by creating blindly, impulsively, under the lead of cerebral processes ; this is feeling. It ends by creating with prevision, selection, thought ; this is knowledge.” The action of the Intellect on the Sensations has been well described thus : “ An interpretation of Sensations is requisite to the production of all emotions, and the more difficult the interpretation — the higher and more rare will be the emotion. Emotion, therefore, presupposes Intellect and elevated emotions an elevated Intellect.”†

The same writer says : “ Sentiment becomes more profound in proportion as it becomes more thoroughly pervaded by intellectual comprehension.” And again : “ The emotion is entirely due to the link which connects the two feelings — the sensation and the emotion ; in other words, to an operation of Intellect.”

Schiller said the same : “ Two things are neces-

* Professor Baldwin, “ Handbook of Psychology.”

† Holmes-Forbes.

sary for the poet and artist; he must rise above reality, and he must remain within the sensuous. Where both these exigencies are fulfilled equally, there is æsthetic art."* Sully says in one of his thoughtful and suggestive essays†: "In listening to a beautiful composition, a distinct and considerable element of gratification arises from a play of intellectual consciousness." And again:

"The intellectual consciousness which subserves this enjoyment of music, is that which employs itself in searching for and recognising all the elements of musical beauty."

Another writer says ‡: "A perception of Form, whether it be in melodic succession of sounds or in organised combinations of sounds, lies at the root of our appreciation of the Beautiful in Music, and therefore no emotion consequent upon the appreciation of the Beautiful can exist until the Intellect has apprehended the Form, and therefore, no legitimate emotions can precede the intellectual process."

I think we have now considerably cleared the ground which surrounds the subject of the Lecture. We find that in the Hearer the sensations of sound are apprehended, analysed, grouped, and formulated by the Intellect; next, that the Intellect is

* Quoted by Hildebrand.

† "Aspects of Beauty in Musical Form."

‡ Gurney. "Power of Sound."

occupied in passing judgment on the conformity of the work to the recognised regulations of the art; next, that this intellectual operation calls into activity our sentiment of the beautiful, with which a certain amount of emotion is always inseparably allied. In short, the action of hearing music requires — (1) Sensation, (2) Intellect, (3) Sentiment of the Beautiful, (4) Emotion; or, to state it in another way, “there can be no emotion where there is no sentiment of the Beautiful; no sentiment of the Beautiful without an operation of the Intellect; no operation of the Intellect without Sensations of Sound.”

It was, I hope, clearly proved to you that there is no such thing as Sound in itself, it is merely the name of a sensation. It follows that Music, being made out of Sounds as its only material, must also be purely subjective. This is obvious. The fact that musicians have made into a system, have codified and analysed the commonest “expressions” or “sayings” of music, until we have a well-marked series of grammatical treatises, in no wise shakes the fact that the Art exists only in our brains, and is not an external entity. It is really quite remarkable how easily and rapidly some thinkers and writers fall into the obvious pitfall of mistaking the generalisations gathered from works of Art not only for a *cause*, but also for an

entity; or, as it is termed by them — the Art itself.*

Herbarth, who is quoted with commendation by Hanslick, expresses his astonishment that musicians should still cling to the belief that “feelings” can be the “proximate cause of the rules of simple and double counterpoint. For these alone form the groundwork of music.”

Of course the feelings of men first decided what was pleasurable in polyphony, and from the specimens of pleasurable polyphony were afterwards drawn the rules of counterpoint; therefore it is perfectly true that “feelings are the proximate cause of the laws of counterpoint,” however shocking this may sound to some theorists. One would have thought it impossible that any reasonable being could look upon a Grammar as the *cause of a language*, instead of viewing it in its true light as *a result of a language*.

The French philosopher puts this fact into the smallest number of words when he says: “There is no Art in itself.” †

Sully says clearly enough that in Music, “the intellectual activities are not called away to objec-

*The author of a little book published in Paris at the time of the introduction of the Polka, after investing the dance with all sorts of deep meanings and properties, begins in a fit of enthusiasm to talk about the “Eternal Laws of Polka”!

† Véron.

tive realities underlying the impressions, they have to find their satisfaction in observing the formal aspects of the impressions themselves. Hence the comparatively subjective character of this art, and the peculiar depth of emotional delight to which it is commonly said to minister.* It may also be stated in another form: "Beautiful qualities are mental creations, they have no existence in the objects themselves," † and: "The only factor of beauty which exists in an object is the cause."‡

We can now realize the truth of Hegel's statement that "Music is the most subjective of all Arts." Perhaps the suggestion implied in these words that one art may be more subjective than another requires some little explanation. Hegel simply means that in some arts the "external cause" is more permanent than in others; for example, no one can deny that in Sculpture the external cause of our sensations is in a way more permanent than in Painting; or that the external cause is still more permanent in Architecture; but this does not at all imply that the "cause" is "the beautiful." From one point of view Music can hardly be said to have any permanent external cause at all: a full score of a symphony, opera, or

* Essay on the Nature and Limit of Musical Expression.

† Holmes-Forbes, *Science of Beauty*. ‡ *Idem*.

oratorio, is nothing more than a description of the manner in which "the causes of sounds" are to be made use of: at every performance of a great work of musical art the *tone-picture has to be re-painted* according to these directions or descriptions; and, as we all know by experience, the attempts to reproduce these tone-pictures vary in every possible degree, from very good to very bad. Poor composer! thus to be at the mercy of clumsy daubers! But, on the other hand, it is this necessity for perpetually-recurring new personal interpretation which gives the works of music an all-pervading interest, a humanising charm, denied to other arts. Truly then we may say with Hegel that "Music is the most subjective of all Arts" — it is, in fact, purely *subjective*; so please beware of the use of such expressions as "art in itself," "music in itself," or "objective art." And never speak of beauty as "existing in *the medium* of an art!" Never try to perform the impossible intellectual feat of realising that music is a "*self-subsistent* form of the beautiful!" *

Keep clear, too, of such Idealism as is embodied in the following: — "That which is beautiful is

* I suppose the author who uses these words has succeeded in realising that Mr. Pickwick and Sam Weller are *self-subsistent* forms of the amusing!

beautiful in itself, and independent of the pleasure which it gives, or the end it serves." When applied to our art of music, this dictum would resolve itself into the following sheer nonsense:— The beauty of music, which exists, and only can exist, *inside* the perceiving subject, exists also *outside* the perceiving subject(!): and it is beautiful in itself although it has no objective reality(!) or separate existence(!).

But to resume; we have already shown that the sentiment of Beauty cannot exist without an operation of the Intellect; it would seem, however, that the operations or processes of the sentiment of Beauty baffle the analysis of the very Intellect out of which they spring. Helmholtz expresses this admirably; he says: "No doubt is now entertained that beauty is subject to laws and rules dependent on the nature of human intelligence. The difficulty consists in the fact that these laws and rules on whose fulfilment beauty depends, and by which it must be judged, are not consciously present to the mind, either of the artist who creates the work, or the observer who contemplates it." Mr. Holmes-Forbes says: "It is, of course, an undeniable fact that all human beings feel an admiration for beauty in music or in any other art, to an extent in accordance with the special training of their minds and the particular sensibilities of

their physical constitution. But it is when we attempt to analyse the *cause* of the beautiful, and the *process* by which we appreciate it, that so much disagreement and difference of opinion is found, not only amongst ordinary persons, but amongst most gifted philosophers." Thus it happens that we find so much said about æsthetics and yet so few systematized conclusions. The word "æsthetic" has been much misunderstood and brought so low during the last few years by being applied to persons of peculiar dress and bearing, and of a limp frame of body and of mind, that personally, instead of speaking of the science of *Æsthetics*, I should prefer to use the term "Kalology" — the Science of the Beautiful.

We have before shown that the sentiment of beauty is conditioned by the training of the Intellect, and that the Intellect can only procure through the sensations the material whereon to pass judgment. It is perfectly evident, therefore, that all inductions in Kalology must be based on purely subjective facts.

In other words, we cannot hope to discover anything about the Beautiful except through our own sensations and thought.* So, the sentiment

* Such systems of æsthetics are pronounced "unphilosophical" by Mr. Hanslick! but why? (See p. 17 of Cohen's excellent translation of "The Beautiful in Music.")

of beauty must ultimately prove to be the offspring of sensations, although of sensations which have gone through the coördination of the intellect — through the intellectual test of good or bad and right or wrong — of sensations, if one may be allowed the expression, which have been purified by the intellect, as gold in the fire. It seems hardly necessary to say that the advice given by some, that we should seek for Beauty in the “Beautiful Object,” is perfectly useless, because the search can only be carried on by our intellect through the senses; and say what we please about the “beautiful object,” we can give no further account of it than *that which is furnished to our Intellect by means of our Sensations*. But false as the realistic or objective method of seeking the laws of beauty has proved in other arts, it is doubly false in its bearing on the musical art; for what in the world is there in the realm of music which can be described as the “beautiful object”! It is the old story; if you allow men to do so, they will always set to work to form a reality or entity out of their mere “form of thought,” and then will proceed to describe it and invest it with authority. If musicians wish to escape the incubus of a code of “laws of the beautiful,” which will inevitably be thrust upon us by someone who thinks he has discovered the “beautiful object” — walked round

it, measured it, and deduced from it laws which are in future to guide the poor unfortunate "perceiving subject" — they must protest against and cast aside for ever, those realistic notions which are put forward from time to time as the true basis of Kalology. Kant wrote in 1781: "The Germans are the only people who at present use the æsthetic for what others call the criticism of taste. There is implied in that name a false hope, first conceived by the excellent analytical philosopher, Baumgarten, of bringing the critical judgment of the beautiful under rational principles, and to raise its rules to the rank of a science. But such endeavours are vain. For such rules or criteria are, according to principal sources, empirical only, and can never serve as definite *a priori* rules for our judgment in matters of taste; on the contrary, our judgment is the real test of the truth of such rules."*

The sentiment of beauty must have some principles and laws, but the only firm ground which philosophers have reached in this direction seems to be the fact that there is an undoubted connection between the "beautiful" and the higher sense of "the good." This connection brings our feelings with respect to what is beautiful into close contact with our best moral aspira-

* Max Müller's translation of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason," Vol. II., p. 19.

tions, and it is quite possible that the remarkable purity and ideality of the emotions produced by the best music, are in a way due to this intuitive association.

And as we also intuitively associate together "the good" and "the true," so, too, beauty has been described as "a manifestation in *feeling* of that attribute which, when manifested in intellectual *knowledge*, is called truth."* And as "the true" and "the good" are both in a manner ranged under our abstract idea of perfection, it has been cleverly said that "truth is perfection *thought*, beauty is perfection *felt*."

As sensation and thought are so indissolubly connected, so also, in listening to good music, are the Intellect and the Apprehension of the Beautiful. But the sentiment of Beauty can never be roused without producing an emotion; and it is the highest achievement of genius in a composer to produce pure and deep emotions in the hearer. There is almost a complete accordance amongst those who have treated of æsthetics, that not only in music, but in all other arts, the emotional frame of mind or mood of a creator of a work of art so influences his mode of expression that the perfected work of art produces the same mood (or at least a tendency towards it) in the mind of the contemplator or hearer.

* See Bosanquet. *History of Æsthetic*, p. 184.

Véron says that in music “ the combination and arrangement of sounds do their work by recalling and re-producing the very emotions that gave them birth.”

But before proceeding further it is absolutely necessary for us to make a short digression. We have reached that stage of our enquiry which compels us to answer the question, what is the highest and best class of music; for it is only through the highest and best that the composer's emotional mood makes itself felt by the hearer. We must first decide between music set to words, that is, Vocal Music (whether accompanied or unaccompanied), and pure Instrumental Music, for these are the rival claimants for the premiership.

In all Vocal Music there can be no doubt that the words (unless we consider them as no better than solfeggi) have a definite power of suggesting or leading up to a particular emotion in the hearer, and that this power or property, exists apart and distinct from the actual character of the music: that is to say, the music and words have in a sense to share between them the responsibility of the emotional mood of the hearer. It was not until instrumental music had long asserted its independence that its real powers were discovered. It is evident, therefore, that in all questions relating to the sphere of music as an art, we are compelled to

appeal to the pure instrumental branch, on the ground that such music receives no help from external sources. We have no form of Art consisting of a combination of instrumental music and pictures only (without words) ; but assuming that for a whole evening, orchestral music accompanied stage-scenery moving, or frequently changed, however pleasurable or impressive the result might be, this too would have to be considered as *not* the highest class of music, on the same grounds as before.

There is another consideration of great importance, it is this : as soon as we hear a combination of music and words we have to exercise our intellect on the fitness and appropriateness of the junction of the two. In other words, the composer has a limitation to his tone-painting in the needs or scope of the words, whilst the hearer on his part has to go through an intellectual process whilst deciding on their "setting" being good or bad. This particular process is absent in pure instrumental music, hence its increased power of appealing to our higher emotions. When instrumental and vocal music are also coupled with scenery, as in the opera, a third element is introduced which is foreign to music as an Art, therefore this too is not the highest class of music. Anton Rubinstein,*

* " Die Musik und ihre Meister."

whose opinion must carry with it great weight, considers the opera a subordinate branch of our art, on the ground that the compass of human voices sets limits to melody which instruments do not; that emotions of joy or of sorrow do not permit this limitation; also because the overflow of feelings is beyond the most beautiful words, is inexpressible in speech (unaussprechlich); and further, that instrumental music is, as such, invested with a higher power of expression.

This is very ably stated by Sully, who says * :
 “ It seems manifest that the most beautiful realization of structural beauty and sublimity possible to music is attained by instrumental composition, in which there are no limiting conditions of definite expression, but in which every device of change in melody and harmony, in tone-colour, and time, may be freely resorted to, while at the same time all ends of pleasing symmetry and proportion of parts are fully satisfied.

“ Without doubt, a large measure of such grandeur of form is attainable by vocal music, especially in the complex dramatic structure of the opera and oratorio; yet the pursuit of perfect beauty of form is always limited in these cases by the need of clearly defining the shades of thought, and

* “ Aspects of Beauty in Musical Form.” See also in the essay, “ On the nature and limits of Musical Expression.”

of duly expressing the successive phases of change-ful emotion."

There can be no doubt that when music is severed from words and becomes purely instrumental, the necessity for presenting it to us in a definite Art-form is greatly increased.

No matter how trifling or worthless the words of vocal music may be, they present to the mind a link between the intention and the mode of expression of the composer, and so provide a basis for that running comment of the intellect, which, as we have seen, immediately follows upon the sensations produced by music. Or, to state it briefly : in pure instrumental music an amorphous and undeveloped series of melodic and harmonic progressions leaves the Intellect no function to perform ; how can the intellect decide whether the mode of expression of a composer is suitable to his design, if he evidently has no particular design ?

All concert-goers are aware that a very distinct attempt has been made of late years to transfer the amorphous style of the later development of the Opera into the realms of pure instrumental music. But it is most interesting to note that when this attempt is made, the composers of these efforts have not allowed their compositions to be described simply as " a piece by " . . . or " a movement by " but they

have given descriptive titles or rather texts,—quotations from poets or prose-writers : the words thus given are clearly intended in a subordinate manner to take the place of the words of a vocal composition, that is, to provide the hearer with some notion of the composer's aim, so that his intellect may judge of the relation between the aim and the success shown in reaching it. It is (to describe it in an exaggerated manner) much the same as if the words of a song were read by, or read to an audience, and then the song were *played* to them on instruments only.

Absurd as this suggestion may seem, it would be, and may hereafter be, a perfectly legitimate form of art ; indeed, the words of songs are so seldom audible (owing to the defective enunciation of singers), that many of us would prefer to hear the words of the song first and the music afterwards. But the public will always greedily clutch at anything which will give them a notion of what they ought to think about, or, in many cases, give them something to think about at all, whilst listening to instrumental music.*

* Some of the titles suggest the origin of the composition, others legends, national styles of music, and the lowest types suggest that the music is only imitative. Here are a few : Spring, Summer, Autumn, Winter, Farewell, Pastoral, Military, Battle, Surprise, Clock, Oxford, Jupiter, Hungarian, Italian, Scotch, Irish, Slavonic, Rhenish, Ocean, Faust, Leonora.

Hence the great popularity of annotated programmes. It is said they *create an interest* in the work performed ; it should rather be said that they supply to those, whose want of training prevents them from understanding pure music (that is, to the musically illiterate), something which they cannot themselves provide. The conclusion is this : that the more a composer finds it necessary to tell the hearer what he proposes to describe, the more his work comes under the head of Programme-music and loses its claim to the highest rank ; and the more musically-illiterate a hearer is, the more does he stand in need of assistance by history, stories, quotations from poetry, &c., &c., to enable him to understand instrumental music even to the most limited extent.

But it must not be forgotten that the enormous power of music as a mode of abstract expression is a comparatively recent discovery. This power has received a most unfortunate name, it is called "Romanticism" in music, and the compositions which exhibit this power, are said to belong to the Romantic school. These terms will at once be recognised as drawn from a supposed analogy between music and literature — or music and other arts. But Romanticism is really nothing more nor less than an evolution of thought, or rather, of a "mental attitude" which has shown itself not

only in Arts, Philosophy, and Literature, but in every other sphere of the expansion of thought and research. The Art of Music proved quite as delicately sensitive to this new "mental attitude" as any other art, perhaps more so. The rise of so-called Romanticism in music was, in fact, the natural correlative of the later philosophical tendencies to investigate things, facts, and living beings, rather than to seek for abstract principles; to construct a science of ethics by induction from the known conditions of man's moral and social life, rather than from *a priori* laws. But its immediate effect was to give a great impulse to individualism in Art, by making a man himself the highest study of man; and in every direction its tendency was towards concentration of observation of separate units, as being in reality the source of the condition of the mass. This tendency showed itself in our art of music by the rapid growth of compositions having for their object not so much the exciting of admiration for the cleverness or ingenuity of their construction, or of respect for their obedience to conventional laws, as, a distinct appeal on the part of the composer to the feelings and emotions of individual hearers, so far as their training could place them in sympathy with his own frame of mind and emotional mood.

The following quotations show this craving for an outlet of individualism, both in the creator and contemplator of works of art. . . “ Art, the outward manifestation of the inner life, must also have its individual character, depending on the individuality of the man and the times and circumstances by which his inner life may be affected.” *

“ Art is but the awakened expression of the individuality of man.” † “ A work must display some human individuality if it is to have the power to inspire true æsthetic emotion.” ‡ “ Art is the direct expression of subjectivity.” § “ In the modern world of culture there are no great unifying emotional forces attaching themselves to objects loved and believed in ; therefore men are thrown upon themselves. For deep art pleasures they are thrown entirely upon their own individualities, and an attempt to appeal to men through any other way than that of individuality is felt as tyrannical. If modern minds are to be appealed to deeply, it must be through giving freedom to their individual tendencies. But when this is done there is no doubt about the depth of the pleasure it brings.” || “ A glance at the analysis of musical impression shows that before and above

* Adolph. B. Marx. † Véron, “Æsthetics.” ‡ *Idem.*
§ *Idem.* || Donovan, “From Lyre to Muse.”

all else the effect of music is to give freedom to each listener's most secret impulses, to his acquired and inherited dispositions of mind and heart." *
 "I do not merely wish to hear something, but I want to hear such sounds as shall accord with the feelings that move in my own breast." †

A little consideration will show that this is a totally different conception of the function of the art of music to that held by the older classical writers. I do not for one moment mean to say that the writers of the classical type never conveyed emotions to their hearers: when they really composed under the influence of their own emotion, this necessarily showed itself in the far-reaching and penetrating influence of their music; but they did not compose with a definite purpose of arousing emotion. When works composed prior to the middle or latter portion of the last century contain an emotional element, it must be looked upon more as undesigned than as the result of a predetermined aim.

This spirit of individualism was one of the fundamental causes of the many-sided efforts to secure personal freedom of thought and expression, which we recognise in reformations of religion, in political reforms, and in aims of later art and philosophy. Hence it naturally follows that

* Véron, "Æsthetics." † Marx.

Romanticism implies that frame of mind which desires to assert itself, to announce its freedom from restraint, or even to set itself up in opposition to the rules and regulations accepted by the many. In other words, we find in it a rebellion of the natural against the artificial; of the spontaneous against the conventional; and a definite desire to uphold personal opinion against dogmas held collectively. It thus becomes a protest against all previously held as authoritative, formal, classic, scholastic, or academic.

The fears entertained by many estimable people that this outburst of individualism, which is even now burning strongly amongst art and artists, would produce anarchy and upset the throne of art altogether, have *in music* certainly proved to be without foundation. For, as well stated by the writer in Grove's Dictionary,* "It was not that the Romanticists deliberately rejected or even undervalued classic models, but that, borne onward by the impulse to give free expression to their own individuality, they did not suffer themselves to be bound by forms, however excellent, which they felt to be inadequate for their purpose."

We are now able to bring our long digression to a close, for we all know that Symphonic Form

* "Romanticism" (Mrs. Wodehouse).

has, up to the present time, proved itself of sufficient elasticity of outline not to hamper the free aspirations of genius, and to be, moreover, a form that by the prescribed variation in the character of its successive movements permits a composer to express emotions of different and most contrasted kinds; while, on the other hand, the form is sufficiently well defined and recognizable to give the hearers some tangible basis of intellectual activity, combined with that indefinite feeling of repose which is felt when it is known that the composer *has* selected a form, and that we may look for the expression of his thought and emotions within that form.

We have now concluded that pure instrumental music is a more advanced walk of art than vocal music, and that symphonic form is the highest form of instrumental music yet discovered.

Assuming then that a genius has composed a symphony, the question is—How far and within what limits can he *express emotion* in his composition, and how far and within what limits can the hearer *feel emotion*?

There is a general concurrence that the more emotional the mood of a composer, the more emotional will be his musical production, assuming that he has the technical skill and training to express his thoughts. It must also be a fact

beyond dispute that a composer must be of a highly imaginative, as well as sensitive temperament, otherwise invention would be impossible, and art would find itself walking round and round in a circle incapable of expansion. But the most widely divergent opinions exist as to the limitation of this power of a composer of causing emotion, and in the hearer of feeling it. If music is a mode of expression, it seems hardly necessary to prove that an emotional man must undesignedly mould his expressions in such a way as to convey the emotion he feels. This certainly is the case in ordinary language, why deny it in the case of music? All of us must have felt the difference of the effect produced on us by reading merely intellectual, well-constructed poetry, and that produced by poetry poured forth from a heart strung to high emotional tension. But the cause of the complete breakdown of all efforts to gauge or systematise this action and re-action of emotion, lies in the fact that no two people are similarly constituted as regards temperament, without reference to the acquired results of training and education. Assuming, therefore, that two men are, as regards training and education, fairly on a level, it is quite possible to hear them diverge hopelessly on this question, owing to the fact that emotions may

be called up in one to which the other is an entire stranger.*

Then again, there is a very natural tendency of those who have devoted a large portion of their lives to the study of the art, to value rather lightly the emotional effects of music and to look for the source of their pleasure chiefly to the action of their intellect, simply because the intellect is so fully occupied that their emotions are, as it were, thrown back. But on the other hand, there exists a large class who undervalue the necessity for any real training in music as a means of appreciating its beauty. They think, in fact, that music will, in their special case, be generous enough to make a short cut to their emotions, without troubling their intellect to exercise its functions.

Amongst these must be included Gurney, who, after allowing that "technical acquirements" facilitate acquaintance with music and give tenacity to the memory, goes on to say, "but it is very important that those who lack them should realize that they make no vital revelations; that perception and enjoyment may be absolutely perfect without them." This is a most dangerous state-

*"It must not be supposed that all men are similarly gifted either with the special character of intellect which has the power of leading up to and producing emotions or with the gift of the emotional capability itself." (Holmes-Forbes).

ment, for no perception or enjoyment of a *work of art* can be called perfect in which the intellect has not taken part, and, unquestionably, a knowledge of grammar, form, and construction does make *vital revelations* to the hearer, which increase his pleasure to a remarkable degree. This is a matter of daily experience to those who possess such technical acquirements, though denied, perhaps naturally enough, by those who have not the knowledge, and, consequently, have never had the resulting experience. The same author drifts away from the truth even farther when he says, "though the power of technical analysis might give him (the hearer) considerable extraneous interest, it would not alter the essence of the impression, or make it at all more delightful to him." It must be highly satisfactory to those who have devoted a life-time to the study of their art to find that their reward is to have gained "considerable *extraneous* interest" in their art! *Extraneous* indeed!

Both types of hearers and critics do much mischief, the "intellectualists" would eventually narrow the compass of the art, until its highest level would be "great respectability" as proved by its entire conformity to good musical "manners"; the "emotionalists" would destroy the art *as an art* by denying the validity of, and

ignoring the necessity for, rules and regulations, and they would, and do, bring the art into utter disrepute amongst thoughtful persons, on account of the absurd claims they put forward on its behalf.

Now, in discussing the character and limitation of the emotional effect of music, we must, if you please, assume that we have as our exponent a perfect, an ideal hearer; one whose training in the art qualifies him to measure accurately the harmony, form, and construction of the work, while at the same time he is possessed of one of those warm, sensitive temperaments in which the beautiful immediately calls up emotion. What sort of emotion does he feel?

Of course, it varies by the most delicate grades between the extreme limits of emotional states, according to the character and aim of the music; this is not denied. But the question still remains, are there definite emotions to which we can give such names as sorrow, joy, hope, fear, love?

The state in which I find myself physically whilst listening to pure instrumental music (and each one of us must answer this question for himself) is that of being imbued with a feeling of sadness, or cheerfulness, or with a sentiment of the elevating and purifying effect of "the beautiful."

Such feelings are very distinct, and it is the

unquestionable province of music to produce them.

But when one is held under the spell of an emotional mood, such as any one of those just named, the memory often places before us, very vividly, scenes and memories which have long past by, and it invests them with new meaning and new force.

These mental results are entirely limited to each person individually, and to write 'down these effects of memory, and renewed reflections on past events, and ascribe them either to the composer's heart or head, or to the composition itself, is most foolish and most unprofitable. Yet this is a common and not unpopular path of current literature; let us, in the truest interests of our art, discourage it in every way.

In condemning this absurd claim of "emotion-alists" that they receive definite impressions, pictures, or ideas from pure instrumental music, Hanslick has done good service; and it is only to be regretted that his method is not as good as his motive.

The fact that these claims are generally put forward by those whose knowledge of the art is most limited, ought to cast some suspicion on the value of the claim if not on the verity of the claimants.

I have now done my best to make it clear that the operations of the intellect and the emotions

have to be carefully and delicately balanced against each other, both in the composer and hearer. No composer can reach a high level whose intellect has not been trained in the art by the study of that grammar and that system, which has been culled by successive generations from contemporary literature, and which is the accepted and acknowledged language of the art; having mastered this, he can express his thoughts. On the other hand, no composer can reach a high level without emotion as the initial force and sustaining power of his efforts; for he cannot express what he does not feel; and his composition will, without initial emotion, appeal only to the intelligence of his hearers, and (as we before said) that which appeals only to the intellect cannot be called a work of art.

Now let us take the case of the hearer; he too must maintain the balance between his intellect and his emotions. He who listens to music with a musically untrained intellect, and without an appreciation or knowledge of the laws of construction, progression and form, can gather no more information, can reap no higher result than is gained by a child peeping into a kaleidoscope. The child will tell you he has been in ecstasies while peeping into the kaleidoscope; the untrained hearer of a symphony will tell you he too has

been in ecstasies while listening to it : both are on the same low level.

The pleasure of the intellect in a trained hearer is enormous, but yet it must not be allowed to suppress the flow of sentiment and emotion. The pleasure of emotion is most fascinating, but it must not be allowed to elude the regulation, the discipline of the intellect.*

If I had to choose between the merits of two classes of hearers, one of whom had an intelligent appreciation of music without feeling emotion ; the other, an emotional feeling without an intelligent analysis, I should unhesitatingly decide in favour of the intelligent non-emotionalist.

And for these reasons : the verdict of the intelligent non-emotionalist would be valuable as far as it goes, but that of the untrained emotionalist is not of the smallest value ; his blame and praise are equally unfounded and empty.

* After going through the processes of hearing, understanding, and feeling the music, a highly-trained listener has a concurrent process of Reflection — that is, of passing in review the general results of what his own mental processes have just done ; of course all this goes on with such rapidity that probably few realize that it is reflective ; possibly some listeners do not pass at all through this “ highest stage of consciousness,” this “ reflection upon judgment, in which the abstraction is made of all save the Ego itself.” It is, however, very important that this crowning process, when it takes place, should not be confused with the intellectual process immediately preceding the play of the motions.

But we must pause for a moment to consider an important factor in the production of emotions, and one which requires to be constantly guarded against; I mean, the law of Association of Ideas. "Ideas that in themselves are not all of kin, come to be so united in some men's minds that it is very hard to separate them; they always keep company, and the one no sooner at any time comes into the understanding but its associate comes with it."* "The law of association is this: that empirical ideas which often follow each other create a habit in the mind, whenever the one is produced, for the other always to follow."† I suspect that most people are rather unwilling to admit the force of association in themselves, to do so would be in their view a confession of a certain amount of mental or moral weakness. But what the philosophers say of the association of ideas is equally true of association of emotions, and it is one of the most difficult tasks of the hearer of a composition to distinguish between emotions which are the genuine product of the music, and those which are the result of association; the more so because the hearer (unless extraordinarily "self-collected") may not have the smallest suspicion that he is being automatically moved hither and thither. Many groups of

* Locke. † Kant.

facts, thoughts, or sensations, which have long escaped our memory, leave nevertheless behind a tendency towards a given emotion. All of us know the remarkable vitality of our childish impressions of various tunes or songs.* If in an English Cathedral the first few notes of the Dead March in "Saul" are heard on the organ, an evident thrill of emotion passes through the whole congregation. So, too, when at an imposing state ceremony the roll of drums and the first few bars of the National Anthem herald the approach of Royalty, any observer must have noticed that something much more powerful than mere curiosity is influencing the multitudes as they rise to their feet.

Of course the emotion caused by the association of ideas and feelings connected with religion are the strongest and most deep set in our nature. If some sacred composition of quite second-rate value has been the vehicle of producing in us deep devotional feeling, owing to the special frame of mind we were in, or the solemnity of the circumstances which surrounded us when we heard it, we

* Perhaps one of the earliest forms of association of feelings or emotions in children is shown by their unwavering fidelity to an old doll; when new favourites are proffered, they will often fondle the old doll, even when it has lost head, arms, and legs, and when the hay-stuffing of the trunk gives evident signs of protruding.

shall probably always invest such a composition with a sense of affection and respect far above its real value as a work of art. The reverse is also true; I once heard a very amusing comic song, the melody of which I afterwards discovered to be a favourite evangelical hymn-tune; I need hardly say that if this particular tune is sung at a place of worship when I am present, my frame of mind is not enviable. But association will disturb us and warp our judgment in a manner far more insidious. The saying, "Love a composer, love his music," has a deep meaning. It is an acknowledgment that even personal likes or dislikes may so influence us as to make our criticism follow our temper; and if we look into the matter we shall find that one of the causes of the difficulty which a new composer meets of getting a fair hearing is that *nothing is associated with his name*. I do not think I am unkind if I say that the majority of the public listen to every new composition either with a predilection or prejudice.*

*The public will, of course, denounce this accusation angrily; but the public is not always the best judge of its own mental processes. Of course the only real and unfailling test of the value of new works would be to present them to hearers absolutely without any information as to their composer, character, or aim; each hearer being in a separate cell to prevent collusion! What curious products of the critical faculty both of *dilletanti* and professed critics might be obtained under such circumstances!

Amongst those who are musically illiterate, there is a general tendency to enjoy such music as recalls prior musical pleasure. This will be found applicable not only to the ordinary mass of people, who have no taste for novelty in art because they have no intelligent basis of criticism for it and no mental association with it; it applies equally to the more respectable class of those untrained emotionalists who can talk or think of only one hero-composer, simply because they have learnt by constant association to link his music (perhaps quite unconsciously) with that by the same composer which has previously given them pleasure. Hence the ecstasy which such hearers feel, or say they feel, when listening to the composition of their hero, and hence (which is quite as important) their distaste for, or inability to appreciate the music of any other composer, there being *no emotional association* with compositions they have neglected to hear, or have listened to with a predisposition to dislike, or not to care for. This large and influential class of hearers is moved, as has been cleverly said, by "an uncritical love of violent stimulation"; but at the root of their uncritical love will be discovered the law of association, which in consequence of their want of musical training, chains them up and only allows them the narrowest possible circle of locomotion in the world of art.

The persistence of a type of song amongst the lower classes from the same cause is patent to all. Once establish a "music hall species," and it becomes most difficult to put it out of existence. Having got (at last) completely satiated with a favourite tune, the common fellow does not want something entirely new, but something which will recall his old frame of mind and its pleasures. A class of people, somewhat higher than this socially, cannot at the present time get outside or beyond the "sentimental ballad"; if you doubt this go into the shops of half-a-dozen of our leading publishers of ballads, and ask to be allowed to look through some of the hundreds on sale: the similarity of aim and design, of melodic progression, of modulation, and of the final mob-tickling codas, becomes at first highly amusing, afterwards intensely depressing. Were it not for this terrible law of association, which makes some men love all that recalls old favourites, the market for these wretched ballads would have closed its doors long ago.

The extraordinary impulse given to musical education during the last few years, and the great range of modern analytical literature, have combined to present to hearers a danger of a very insidious kind. In former days, say up to the first quarter of our present century, harmony and

counterpoint were taught and could be learnt, but there still hung a certain veil of mystery over the art of composition, the theory that a composer was "under inspiration," or that he was a sort of "instrument played upon" by some supernatural power, still clung to men's minds; but now, composition as an art is taught well and can be learnt: I mean that all the share in the creation of music which falls to the lot of the intellect has been extracted and formulated — such, for example, as contrast of rhythms, combination of rhythms, relation of key-tonalities in consecutive presentation of melodies, thematic development, harmonic progression, structural outline, and, to a certain extent, even the tone-colour of orchestral treatment — all this is within the reach of a student of ordinary capacity under the guidance of a qualified master. Hence, the rising generation of composers possess a dangerous facility of producing compositions of considerable intellectual interest, of so much interest, in fact, that ordinary hearers may be, and constantly are, tempted to admire the works for their constructional ability, although disclosing a real want of emotional aim or unity. This is no imaginary danger. I myself have listened to scores of such compositions, and have been very curious to hear the verdicts passed upon them. As a rule the less

trained hearers pronounce them, without any qualification, to be of the first rank ; but our more wary and experienced critics have, to my great relief, described them as being "very thoughtful," or "well thought out," but as lacking the fascination of spontaneous emotional aim. To put the case plainly and concisely, it amounts to this : if the "tricks of the craft" are rapidly and skilfully presented to the hearer, he may be tempted to accept ingenuity for talent, method for aim, facility of manipulation for genuine emotional motive and richness of invention.*

Also, I feel so strongly that our real want in England at this moment is not professional performers or even composers, but intelligent hearers, that I venture to point out the hollowness of a belief which is, I am sorry to say, very widespread. I have more than once heard it said that musical knowledge and acquirements are only necessary in the persons of composers and their interpreters, and are not requisite in an ordinary unit amongst an audience. If acted upon, this belief will be absolutely fatal to the progress and growth of music in this country. It is quite possible that many ancient nations got on very

* I hope our professional critics will not allow themselves to be pushed in this direction by the very crowds it is their proper function to lead.

well when the scribes and priests were the only classes who could read and write, but I never yet heard this fact advanced (at all events by any sane person) as an argument against general education. The truth is that as the general spread of education and moral principles amongst the masses *forces* upon the classes above them a higher standard of education and morality; so, too, a general knowledge and acquirement of art amongst the many percipients must inevitably raise the standard of excellence amongst the few producers. It goes without saying that the majority of composers write and produce what they know by experience will be most pleasurable to and warmly welcomed by their hearers; the conclusion is obvious; reduce the intelligence and acquirements of audiences and down will go, proportionately, the average merit of the music presented to them: and *vice versa*, educate your audiences properly, do not allow them to imagine that uncritical impressions, or temporary excitement constitute them art critics, and it will be found that our composers will be compelled to aim after a higher character of production. An author already quoted, uses an argument against the necessity for "technical knowledge in hearers" which has been expressed more racily than he himself expresses it. It has been said "it is absurd to demand so much

knowledge of musical analysis on the part of a hearer, you might as well say that a man may not call a girl pretty unless he has studied anatomy." There is a thinly-disguised fallacy in this statement: if the figure of a woman is depicted on canvas or in stone as *a work of art*, certainly no one ought to say that it is good or bad who does not understand anatomy. The study of the contour of the body, as varied and changed by muscles and groups of muscles when in repose and in motion, is one of the deepest and most serious studies of art-students, and if it is necessary that the painter and sculptor should study anatomy up to this point or in this special relation, it is perfectly certain that no man ought to pose as a critic of their work who has not gone over the same ground.

We have yet one more danger against which musical hearers need be warned. Music, not less than any other creation of human thought, cannot prevent its adherents from falling into two well-defined parties, conservatives and progressionists. The words penned by the historian are as applicable now to music as they are to politics: "Everywhere there is a class of men who cling with fondness to whatever is ancient, and who, even when convinced by overpowering reasons that innovation would be beneficial, consent to it

with many misgivings and forebodings. We find also another class of men, sanguine in hope, bold in speculation, always pressing forward, quick to discern the imperfections of whatever exists, disposed to think lightly of the risks and inconveniences which attend improvements, and disposed to give every change credit for being an improvement. In the sentiments of both classes there is something to approve. But of both the best specimens will be found not far from the common frontier."

The only means by which each one of us can hope to approach this common frontier in our own art, so as not to become either a dry intellectualist or a rapid emotionalist, a grumbling reactionist or unruly progressionist, is by maintaining most carefully the due balance between the intellectual and emotional sides of our constitution.

In the earlier centuries of the growth of our modern music, it was quite natural that men should see in it only an extensive field for pure intellectual enjoyment; but on the other hand, now that the art has proved itself to be a means of stirring and shaping the very emotions, some of us are naturally tempted to underrate the necessity of a sound intellectual musical training in our almost childlike joy at having discovered a new field of enjoyment beyond, though not independent of, the domain of the intellect.

As you will have noticed, no doubt, I have not taken a very "advanced" view of the power of music over the emotions; that is to say, I cannot agree with those who say that music appeals *only* to the emotions, or that it *depicts* definite ideas, or that it *represents* ideas or emotions; speaking in common sober sense, it does none of these things. If, however, the beauty of pure music is grasped and felt by an intellect musically trained, emotions and deep emotions will undoubtedly be stirred up. In the case of an untrained listener, words added to music, and especially words, scenery, acting, and music combined, may greatly intensify his emotional condition; but he must not, therefore, *as people usually do*, attribute all the emotion to the effect of the music, and jump to the conclusion that no training is necessary for its due appreciation. Music has from time to time developed, and found new powers in such a marvellous way that I am the last to say that the somewhat hasty claims which people make for it as a "language of emotion" may not ultimately be legitimate; only, let me warn such claimants that the more music becomes a *language*, the more necessary is it that its *grammar* should be studied by all who pretend to enjoy its beauty and meaning, and certainly by those who venture to criticise it.

It has been urged that, inasmuch as a good

critic of painting can be formed out of a patient student of the best pictures, without studying drawing and without taking a brush in his hand; therefore, a good musical critic can be entirely trained by listening to the best musical works, without possessing technical knowledge or skill of any kind. This analogy is distinctly misleading, for this reason: in the art of painting the primary act of criticism is an easy one — namely, to decide whether the artist has truly depicted the fact or conceivable fact he promised to depict; up to a certain point the most uneducated person can say whether an artist has painted a cow, a man, or a house. But there is no such primary act of criticism possible in music, because it is not *an imitative art*. If I ask some one to listen to Opus 99, No. 3, by . . . What has the composer promised? It is true he has probably aimed at a composition restricted to certain shapes and limits of outline (but even this depends on the date of the work), and his obedience to the laws of form can only be judged by a trained musician, and, therefore, only to a trained musician is the criticism of the goodness or badness of the form possible. There are millions who can say if a cow is painted *like* a cow, to *one* who can by hearing a symphonic movement discover if the accepted laws of binary form have been truly

observed. This is one more proof of the necessary action of the intellect before the emotional is reached. The emotionalist who, owing to ignorance, cannot pass the verdict of his intellect as well as that of his emotions on the merits of a composition cannot in any way be trusted as a critic.

But if the balance between the intellect and the emotions is duly maintained by those who are composers or hearers, who can place a limit to the future of music? "Man is led on from knowledge to knowledge, from power to power, from thought to thought, and here too it is discoverable that every great stage through which he passes is also a preliminary to the subsequent stages into which he rises."* "While music arises in, and in all its phases belongs to the realm of emotion, the limits set to its progress are less absolutely fixed than with other forms of Art."†

May not our own great living philosopher be also a true prophet when, having approached music purely from the side of the scientific analyst, he says: Music is "a language of feelings which may ultimately enable men vividly and completely to impress on each other the emotions they

* And "This law of progress, I repeat, is the fundamental idea which distinguishes the philosophy of our own era from all previous modes of speculation."—W. Smith (Thorndale).

† Bryant's "Hegel."

experience from moment to moment.”* “In its bearings upon human happiness, this emotional language which musical culture develops and refines, is only second in importance to the language of the intellect, perhaps not even second to it.”†

These are bold words, they must stand or fall by the judgment of the unborn future. But though I am a protestant against an “*uncritical* love of violent stimulation” in music, I am no reactionist, and to such a prophecy I say from the bottom of my heart — So be it.

* Herbert Spencer : “ Origin and Function of Music.” † *Idem*.

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